Neurodevelopmental disorders by D'Souza, Hana & Karmiloff-Smith, Annette




Hana  D’Souza1,2,3  and  Annette  Karmiloff-­Smith2,3  
  
1  Sensorimotor  Development  Research  Unit  
Department  of  Psychology  
Goldsmiths,  University  of  London  
2  Centre  for  Brain  and  Cognitive  Development  
Birkbeck,  University  of  London  
3  The  London  Down  Syndrome  Consortium  (LonDownS),    




Keywords:   neurodevelopmental   disorders,   neuroconstructivism,   neuropsychology,  






D’Souza,  H.,  &  Karmiloff-­Smith,  A.  (in  press).  Neurodevelopmental  disorders.  WIREs  
Cognitive  Science.  
  
 Page  2     
ABSTRACT  
Recent   technological   advances  allow  us   to  measure  how   the   infant   brain   functions   in  
ways  that  were  not  possible  just  a  decade  ago.  Although  methodological  advances  are  
exciting,  we  must  also  consider  how  theories  guide  research:  what  we  look  for  and  how  
we  explain  what  we   find.   Indeed,   the  ways   in  which   research   findings  are   interpreted  
affects   the   design   of   policies,   educational   practices,   and   interventions.   Thus,   the  
theoretical  approaches  adopted  by  scientists  have  a  real  impact  on  the  lives  of  children  
with  neurodevelopmental  disorders   (NDDs)  and   their   families,  as  well  as  on   the  wider  
community.  Here,  we  introduce  and  compare  two  theoretical  approaches  that  are  used  
to   understand   NDDs:   the   neuropsychological   account   and   neuroconstructivism.   We  
show  how  the  former,  adult  account  is  inadequate  for  explaining  NDDs  and  illustrate  this  
using   the   examples   of   ‘Williams   syndrome’   and   ‘specific   language   impairment’.  
Neuroconstructivism,  by  contrast,  focuses  on  the  developing  organism  and  is  helping  to  
change   the   way   in   which   NDDs   are   investigated.  Whereas   neuropsychological   static  
approaches   assume   that   one   or  more   “modules”   (e.g.,   visuospatial   ability   in  Williams  
syndrome)   are   impaired   while   the   rest   of   the   system   is   spared   (e.g.,   language   in  
Williams  syndrome),  neuroconstructivism  proposes  that  basic-­level  deficits  have  subtle  
cascading  effects  on  numerous  domains  over  development.  Neuroconstructivism  leads  
researchers  to  embrace  complexity  by  establishing  large  research  consortia  to  integrate  
findings   at   multiple   levels   (e.g.,   genetic,   neural,   cognitive,   environmental)   across  
developmental  time.    
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INTRODUCTION  
Dramatic  increases  in  the  availability  of  data  on  neurodevelopmental  disorders  (NDDs;;  
see  Table  1)  are  providing  new  and  exciting  opportunities   for  understanding  the   infant  
brain  and   the   factors   that   shape   its  development.  Much  of   the  excitement   in   this   field  
can   be   traced   to   technological   advances   that,   in   ways   that   were   not   possible   just   a  
decade   ago,   allow   us   to   measure   how   the   infant   brain   functions.   Although   these  
methodological   advances   are   exciting,   we   must   also   consider   how   theories   guide  
research:  what  we   look   for   and  how  we  explain  what  we   find.  Here  we   compare   two  
very   different   theoretical   approaches   for   explaining   NDDs—the   neuropsychological  
account  and  neuroconstructivism—and  explain  why  we  believe  that  the  latter  approach  
is  more  likely  to  lead  to  better  treatments  and  outcomes.    
  
To  illustrate  the  differences  between  the  two  approaches,  consider  Williams  syndrome.  
Researchers   have   documented   the   fact   that   children   with   Williams   syndrome   have  
problems  with  number  processing.   If  we  adopt  a  neuropsychological  approach1,   2   and  
posit  that  the  brain  is  composed  of  independently  functioning  modules,  one  of  which  is  a  
number-­processing   module,   then   interventions   will   be   focused   specifically   on   the  
number  domain  once  the  deficit  is  identified  in  middle  childhood.  In  contrast,  if  we  adopt  
a   neuroconstructivist   (or   other   developmental)   approach   and   posit   that   number  
processing   is  an  emergent  property  of  a  self-­organizing  system   that   interacts  with   the  
environment,  then  we  will  focus  our  intervention  efforts  much  earlier  in  development  to  
identify   those   influences   that   set   number   processing   on   an   atypical   developmental  
trajectory3.  Indeed,  differences  in  basic-­level  processes  (e.g.,  poor  sustained  attention)  
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might  affect   the  way  in  which  infants  with  Williams  syndrome  scan  numerical  displays,  
faces,   and   other   visual   stimuli.   So,   adopting   a   neuroconstructivist   or   other  
developmental  approach,  we  would   target   those  basic-­level  processes  with   the  aim  of  
improving  developmental  processes  and  outcomes.    
  
THEORETICAL   APPROACHES:   THE   NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL   VERSUS   THE  
NEUROCONSTRUCTIVIST  APPROACH  
Understanding   NDDs   requires   not   only   describing   differences   between   typically  
developing   individuals   and   individuals   with   NDDs,   but   also   understanding   how   these  
differences  emerge  over  developmental   time.  This  entails   tracking  differences  as  early  
in  development  as  possible  and  on  multiple   levels  of  description  (e.g.,  genetic,  neural,  
cognitive,  environmental).  Up  until   recently,  progress  has  been   limited  by  the  absence  
of   suitable   methodologies   for   infants   and   young   children.   Recent   technological  
advances  (e.g.,  new  infant-­friendly  electroencephalography  [EEG,  Figure  1])  allow  us  to  
measure  how  the  infant  brain  functions  (for  a  comparison  of  different  methods  used  to  
measure  infant  brain  activity,  see  Figure  2).  This  enables  researchers  to  elucidate  how  
changes  on  the  neural  level  are  associated  with  changes  on  other  levels  of  description  –  
such  as  cognition  or  behaviour.  Furthermore,  EEG  and  neuroimaging  approaches  have  
the  potential  to  help  identify  important  early  markers  of  neurodevelopmental  disorders  of  
unknown   origin   (e.g.,   attention-­deficit/hyperactivity   disorder,   autism)   before   the  
behavioural   symptoms   emerge   later   in   development.   This   could   potentially   have   high  
clinical  significance  since   it  would  provide  an  opportunity   for   timely   interventions.  EEG  
and  neuroimaging  approaches  can  further  be  used  as  tools  for  assessing  the  impact  of  
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these  interventions.  
  
Although  methodological   advances   are   exciting,   we  must   also   consider   how   theories  
guide  research:  what  we  look  for  and  how  we  explain  what  we  find.  The  interpretation  of  
the   research   findings   then   affects   the   design   of   policies,   educational   practices,   and  
interventions.  Thus,  the  theoretical  approaches  adopted  by  scientists  have  a  real  impact  
on   the   lives   of   many   children   with   NDDs   and   their   families,   as   well   as   on   the   wider  
community.    
  
The   neuropsychological   account   views   the  brain  as   if   it  were  a  Swiss  Army  knife4,  
containing  built-­in,  separate,  special-­purpose  tools.  Proponents  of   this  approach  argue  
that   the   brain   has   discrete   parts,   often   referred   to   as  modules,   each   of   which   has   a  
specific,  evolved  cognitive  function.  They  use  the  existence  of  adult  neuropsychological  
patients   to   support   the   modularity   view.   One   example   given   by   advocates   of   this  
approach   invokes  patients  with   damage   to   the  Fusiform  Face  Area   (FFA),  which   is   a  
part  of  the  cerebral  cortex  located  in  the  temporal  lobe.  The  FFA  is  selectively  activated  
when  adults  perceive  faces5,  6.  When  the  FFA  has  been  damaged  in  adult  patients,  the  
ability   to   identify   faces   is   particularly   impacted   to   the   point   that   otherwise   normally  
functioning   patients   are   unable   to   recognize   their   partner   or   even   themselves   in   the  
mirror7,   8   ([link  –  Prosopagnosia  Research  Centers   -­  http://www.faceblind.org]).  This   is  
the   basis   for   the   claim   that   there   exists   an   independently   functioning   face-­processing  
module.  
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Indeed,   theorists   using   data   from   neuropsychological   patients   and   embracing   the  
modularity   hypothesis   take   the   existence   of   double   dissociations   in   adults   to   make  
strong  claims  about   the   functional   architecture  of   the  human  mind/brain   (e.g.,9-­11;;   see  
discussion   in   Shallice12).   A   double   dissociation   is   established   when   a   specific   brain  
lesion  X  in  Patient  1  relates  to  poor  performance  on  Task  A  but  not  Task  B,  whereas  a  





Task A Task B
Patient 2
Lesion Y
Task A Task B
  
The  usual  assumption   is   that   the  brain   lesion   is   the  direct  cause  of  poor  performance,  
leading  to  the  conclusion  that  the  cognitive  function  necessary  to  perform  well  on  Task  
A   is   linked   to   the   brain   region   damaged   in   Patient   1,   and   vice   versa   for   Patient   2.  
Hence,  double  dissociations  for  different  cognitive  abilities  in  brain-­damaged  adults  are  
used   to   relate  brain  and  cognitive  data  directly,   thereby  elucidating   the  architecture  of  
the  adult  cognitive  system  and  how  brain  lesions  affect  it.  
  
Returning   to   the   Swiss   Army   knife   analogy,   according   to   the   neuropsychological  
account,  it  is  possible  to  selectively  break  one  of  the  parts  (e.g.,  the  can  opener)  without  
affecting  the  other  parts  (e.g.,  the  corkscrew).  But  does  this  analogy  provide  insight  into  
the  functioning  of  the  brain?  We  think  not.  Indeed,  a  growing  body  of  evidence  suggests  
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that   adult   brain   networks   display   large-­scale   patterns   of   interconnectivity   that   are  
inconsistent  with   the  notion   that   there  exist   independently   functioning  modules  per  se  
(for   more   detail,   see14).   Because   it   is   questionable   that   the   neuropsychological  
framework   is   useful   for   explaining   even   adult   neural   and   cognitive   processes,   it   is  
unlikely  to  have  any  explanatory  or  predictive  power  when  applied  to  NDDs  in  children.  
We   will   explain   why   this   is   the   case   using   examples   from   Williams   syndrome   and  
specific  language  impairment  in  the  next  section.  
  
When   the   adult   neuropsychological   approach   is   applied   to   children   with   NDDs,   it   is  
assumed  that  individual  differences  in  cognitive  ability  are  the  result  of  a  deficit  in  one  or  
more   innately   specified   modules,   perhaps   due   to   faulty   genes.   For   example,   a  
“specifically  impaired”  phonological  processor  has  been  purported  to  be  the  root  cause  
of  dyslexia15  and  an  impaired  ‘theory  of  mind’  module  has  been  suggested  to  be  a  major  
causal  factor  in  autism16.  
  
The  static  neuropsychological  approach  contrasts  with  developmental  approaches  such  
as   the   developmental   systems   approach17,   the   dynamic   systems   approach18,   and  
neuroconstructivism19.   These   developmental   approaches   share   the   view   that  
development   is   a   process   of   self-­organization   that   results   from   interactions   between  
multiple  subsystems  within  a  context.  Intrinsic  factors  (e.g.,  physiological,  psychological,  
neural)   as  well   as   extrinsic   factors   (e.g.,   informational   cues,   social   context)   constrain  
each   other   and   shape   the   developmental   process.   Neuroconstructivism   is   the  
developmental  approach  that  has  most  often  been  applied  to  explain  NDDs,  and  thus  
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will  be  the  one  we  focus  on  hereinafter.    
  
In   contrast   to   the   neuropsychological   approach   described   above,   proponents   of   the  
neuroconstructivist  approach  argue  that  adults  with  acquired  brain  lesions  cannot  be  
compared  to  children  with  NDDs.  Although  specific  patterns  of  network  activation  in  the  
brain  are  relatively  stable  (highly  specialized)  in  adults,  they  do  not  necessarily  start  out  
that   way.   Patterns   of   activation   become   increasingly   specialized   over   developmental  
time   (see   Figure   3)   through   interactions   between   various   brain   regions   and   through  
processing  different  types  of  input20-­23.  Thus,  although  any  brain  injury  is  likely  to  impair  
multiple  cognitive   functions,   it   is  more   likely   to  cause  a   relatively  specific  deficit   in   the  
highly   specialized   adult   brain   than   in   the   less   specialized   (and   more   plastic)   infant  
brain19,   23.   Therefore,   the   brain   of   a   child   with   an   NDD   cannot   be   described   as  
composed  of  a  set  of  damaged  versus   intact  parts  (see  discussions   in24-­26).   Instead,   it  
can   be   better   characterized   as   an   atypical   system   developing   under   different  
constraints.  
  
One   surprising   consequence   of   the   neuroconstructivist   view   is   that   even   behavioural  
performance   that   falls   within   the   normal   range   may   be   supported   by   atypical   brain  
processes   in  children  with  NDDs27.  For  example,  despite   their   low   IQ,   individuals  with  
Williams  syndrome  fall  in  the  normal  range  on  two  tests  measuring  face  processing28,  29.  
Yet   the   cognitive   and   neural   processes   that   support   this   performance   in   the  Williams  
syndrome  children  are  very  different  from  those  used  by  typically  developing  children  27.  
Furthermore,   task   performance   by   children   with   NDDs   can   sometimes   surpass  
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performance  by  typically  developing  children  on  the  same  task  (e.g.,30).     Children  with  
autism   spectrum   disorder   are   actually   faster   and   more   accurate   than   typically  
developing   children   in   finding   hidden   shapes   embedded   in   larger  meaningful   pictures  
(e.g.,  finding  a  triangle  within  the  drawing  of  a  pram).  Why?  Because  those  with  autism  
spectrum  disorder   focus  on   local  details  and  are   less  distracted   than  neurotypicals  by  
the  meaning  of  the  whole  picture30.    
  
If   the  developing   infant  brain  starts  out  highly   interactive,   then  an   initial   impairment   in  
one   cognitive   component   is   likely   to   have   cascading   effects   on   other   parts   of   the  
developing  system.  That  is,  a  basic-­level  deficit  in  the  cognitive  system  will  constrain  the  
emergence  of  several  higher-­level  cognitive  functions,  because  these  functions  emerge  
from  complex   interactions   in   the  brain24,   26.  This  early  basic-­level  cognitive  deficit  may  
be   underpinned   initially   by   small   variations   in   one   or   more   factors   including   gene  
expression,  neuronal  growth  and  migration,  synaptogenesis,  and  synaptic  pruning20,  25;;  
(for   a   comprehensive  account  of   early  neural   development,   see31).  These   initial   small  
alterations  interact  with  other  genetic  and  environmental  events  that,  over  time,  give  rise  
to   the   resulting   phenotype.   Such   complexities   make   it   challenging   to   elucidate  
developmental  causes  in  complex,  dynamic,  multi-­level  systems.  To  understand  NDDs,  
it  is  thus  critical  to  account  for  these  dynamic,  complex  interactions  between  and  within  
all  levels  of  organization  across  time,  from  genes  to  environment32.  Simple  explanations  
may  seem  more  tractable  but  they  do  not  suffice;;  we  must  embrace  complexity.  
  
As  a  result  of  cascading  effects  and  multilevel  interactions,  children  with  NDDs  are  likely  
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to   develop   atypical   neural   and   cognitive   trajectories   with   numerous   widespread  
impairments24,  26,  rather  than  a  set  of  impaired  and  intact  modules.  A  single  deficit  may  
have   differential   cascading   effects   on   the   system,   with   some   functions   being   more  
affected  than  others.  Thus,  some  atypicalities  may  be  subtle  and  difficult  to  detect,  using  
standardized   measures   designed   for   children   with   typically   developing   brains33.  
Because  these  subtle  differences  are  hard  to  identify,  they  lead  some  theorists  to  claim  
that  impaired  modules  co-­exist  with  “intact”  modules  in  NDDs,  even  though  fine-­grained  
analyses  have  revealed  this  not  to  be  the  case.  
  
DOES  THE  NEUROCONSTRUCTIVIST  APPROACH  EXPLAIN  THE  DATA  BETTER?    
One  example   that   illustrates   the  advantages  of   the  neuroconstructivist  approach   is  
that  of  Williams  syndrome  ([links  -­  Williams  Syndrome  Association:  http://www.williams-­
syndrome.org;;  Williams  Syndrome  Foundation:  http://www.williams-­syndrome.org.uk]).    
  
Within   the  neuropsychological   framework,  Williams  syndrome   is  often   invoked  as  a  
model   NDD.   This   is   because   of   its   known   genetic   etiology   and   its   uneven   cognitive  
profile,   with   seemingly   intact   and   impaired   components.   Proponents   of   the  
neuropsychological   approach   characterize   this   syndrome   as   having   specific  
impairments   in   spatial   and   numerical   cognition  modules34   alongside   “intact”   language  
and  face  recognition  modules34-­41.  Consequently,  Williams  syndrome  is  often  compared  
with  other  NDDs   in  an  attempt   to  delineate  double  dissociations  not  only   in  adults  but  
also  in  children.  
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For   example,   a   double   dissociation   has   been   repeatedly   proposed   between  Williams  
syndrome  and  ‘specific   language  impairment’  (SLI),  a  developmental  disorder  that—as  
its   name   suggests—appears   to   target   language   development   in   a   highly   specific  
manner.  Researchers  point  to  this  double  dissociation  as  evidence  that  language  is  the  
product  of  a  stand-­alone  cognitive  module  (e.g.,38,  42,  43).  Accordingly,  proponents  of  this  
double  dissociation  describe  Williams  syndrome  as  a  disorder  in  which  the  “system  for  
language   is   selectively   spared”   (36;;   p.   193)   and  SLI   as   a   disorder   characterized   by   a  
single   impairment   in   the   language   domain   in   an   otherwise   intact   brain37,   38,   44-­46.  
Furthermore,   the   proposed   double   dissociation   is   used   to   support   the   notion   that   “a  
grammar  module”  develops  normally  in  Williams  syndrome  alongside  low  IQ  while  being  
selectively   impaired   in  SLI   alongside  normal   IQ,   suggesting   that   syntax   is   a   cognitive  
module  operating  independently  of  nonverbal  cognitive  abilities  in  children  (e.g.,38,  42,  43).  
  
In  fact,  however,  the  purported  double  dissociation  between  Williams  syndrome  and  SLI  
does   not   exist.   Rather,   as   proposed   by   the   neuroconstructivist   approach,   several  
aspects  of   the  brain  and  cognitive  system  in  both  Williams  syndrome  and  SLI  develop  
atypically25,   47-­49.   For   example,  when   the   purported   double   dissociation  was   tested   by  
directly   comparing   individuals  with  Williams   syndrome   and  SLI   on   a   battery   of   verbal  
and  non-­verbal   tests,  no  double  dissociation  emerged.  Although  children  with  Williams  
syndrome  did  perform  significantly  worse  on  non-­verbal  tasks,  their  performance  in  the  
verbal  domain  did  not  differ  from  that  of  individuals  with  SLI50.  Furthermore,  despite  the  
fact  that  language  is  a  relative  strength  in  individuals  with  Williams  syndrome,  it  still  falls  
well  below   the   level  of  proficiency  expected  of  a   typically  developing  child  of  a  similar  
 Page  12     
chronological  age.   In  other  words,  within  Williams  syndrome,   language  ability  may  be  
strong  relative  to  other  domains  (e.g.,  visuospatial  ability),  but  it  cannot  be  considered  to  
represent   an   intact   language  module   because   it   develops   atypically.  Most   aspects   of  
language,   including   the   lexicon51,   morphosyntax52   and   pragmatics53,   are   atypical   in  
Williams  syndrome  when  compared  to  typically  developing  children.  
  
Even  the  claim  that  SLI  entails  a  selective  impairment  of  language  alongside  preserved  
non-­verbal  intelligence  (e.g.,54-­56)  is  controversial.  Although  individuals  with  SLI  perform  
within   the   normal   range   on   non-­verbal   intelligence   tests,   they   have   been   shown   to  
perform  significantly  worse  than  their  siblings47,  which  points  to  subtle,  more  widespread  
impairments57.   Moreover,   SLI   has   been   associated   with   numerous   other   (subtle)  
cognitive,   sensory,   and   motor   difficulties47,   58-­64.   Finally,   the   double   dissociation   is  
proposed   purely   on   behavioural   evidence   whereas,   as   predicted   by   the  
neuroconstructivist  approach,  widespread  brain  atypicalities  are  found  in  both  Williams  
syndrome  and  SLI  (see  review  by49,  65).    
  
HOW  THEORETICAL  APPROACHES  INFLUENCE  RESEARCH  STRATEGIES  
As  mentioned  earlier,  the  theoretical  approaches  that  scientists  adopt  influence  the  type  
of  research  questions  they  ask,  which  in  turn  determine  the  studies  they  carry  out  and  
the  way  that  they  interpret  their  findings.  These  decisions  have  consequences  for  health  
and  social  policies  as  well  as  for  education  and  intervention.    
  
The  neuropsychological  approach   generates   research   questions   such   as   “By  what  
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age   does   each   module   come   online?”,   “Which   modules   are   impaired   and   which   are  
intact?”,   and   “Where   are   these   modules   located   in   the   brain?”   Such   questions  
necessarily  lead  to  the  search  in  children  with  NDDs  for  specifically  impaired  modules  in  
an   otherwise   intact   brain.   This   type   of   research   tends   to   generate   interventions   that  
target  one  specific  cognitive  system  in  isolation  of  others  (e.g.,  language  in  SLI;;  number  
in  dyscalculia).  However,  as  argued  above,  it  cannot  be  assumed  that  the  infant  brain  is  
modular.  Brain  circuits   interact  across  different   regions  at  every  age,  but  especially   in  
early   development   when   they   are  more   plastic   and   less   specialized.   Thus,   the   static  
research   questions   that   are   generated   by   the   neuropsychological   approach   are   now  
giving   way   to   new,   more   dynamic   questions   such   as   “How   do   neural   circuits   and  
cognitive  functions  emerge  and  change  over  developmental  time?”,  “Will  an  early,  low-­
level  deficit  be  followed  by  compensation  or  compounding  of  effects?”  “Which  domains  
interact   across   developmental   time?”,   and   “What   aspects   of   the   ever-­changing  
environment  affect  gene  expression  and  cognitive  development?”  
  
Neuroconstructivists  are  helping  to  change  the  way  in  which  NDDs  are  investigated.  
Whereas  neuropsychological  approaches  assume  that  basic-­level  deficits  directly  impair  
one   or   more   “modules”   while   sparing   the   rest   of   the   system,   neuroconstructivism  
suggests   that   basic-­level   deficits   have   cascading   effects   that   alter   interactions   within  
and   between   networks.   These   cascades   act   to   constrain   the   emergence   of   many  
higher-­level  (interactive)   functions.   In  other  words,  a  basic-­level  deficit   that  affects  one  
functional  domain  (e.g.,  in  visual  attention)  may  constrain  the  emergence  of  functions  in  
other  domains  (e.g.,  in  language)  because  the  developing  system  is  highly  interactive;;  it  
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is  not  composed  of  isolated,  minimally  interactive  brain  parts.  Thus,  neuroconstructivism  
requires   that   researchers   adopt   a   truly   developmental   approach,   focused   on   change  
over  time,  to  gain  insight  into  interactions  among  the  genetic,  cellular,  neural,  cognitive,  
behavioral,  and  environmental   levels  of  description.  This   is  critical   in  order   to  discover  
how  an   initial  perturbation   in  one  domain,  and  at  one   level  of  analysis   (e.g.,  genetic),  
may  over  time  influence  other  domains  at  other  levels  of  analysis.  
  
The  neuroconstructivist  approach  has  also  helped  to  engender  a  shift  in  research  from  
small  domain-­focused  research  teams  (focused,  for  example,  on  numerical  cognition)  to  
large  collaborative  networks  of  multidisciplinary   teams   that   include  geneticists,  cellular  
and  molecular  biologists,  neuroscientists,  social  scientists,  and  psychologists  as  well  as  
computational  modelers  and  others.  To  facilitate  this  collaboration,  large  cross-­scientific  
consortia   are   being   established   (e.g.,   British   Autism   Study   of   Infant   Siblings   [BASIS]  
[http://www.basisnetwork.org],  European  Autism  Interventions  -­  A  Multicentre  Study  for  
Developing   New   Medications   [EU-­AIMS]   [http://www.eu-­aims.eu],   London   Down  
Syndrome   Consortium   [LonDownS]   [http://www.ucl.ac.uk/londowns],   and   Pediatric  
Imaging,  Neurocognition  and  Genetics  [PING]  [http://pingstudy.ucsd.edu]).    
  
Furthermore,  the  neuroconstructivist  view,  like  all  developmental  approaches,  highlights  
the   importance   of   tracking   developmental   trajectories66,   beginning   as   early   in  
development  as  possible,  in  order  to  unpack  how  interactions  at  multiple  levels  give  rise  
to   the   resulting   NDDs.   For   example,   in   the   case   of   Williams   syndrome,   the   genetic  
deletion   likely   affects   basic-­level   processes   that   have   cascading   effects   on   various  
 Page  15     
domains   over   developmental   time25,   48.   Being   able   to   ascertain   how   tiny   variations  
interact   with   factors   early   in   development   provides   greater   insight   into   the   emerging  
phenotype.   Examining   developmental   trajectories   is   also   important   for   identifying  
possible  protective   factors  (factors  that   improve  outcome)  and  risk   factors  (factors  that  
worsen   outcome).   Uncovering   the   cascading   effects   of   a   basic-­level   perturbation,   as  
well  as  any  protective  and  risk  factors,  are  critical  for  the  design  of  early  diagnostic  tests  
and  intervention  strategies.    
  
To  be  able  to  tailor  early  diagnostic  tests  and  interventions,  it  is  necessary  to  compare  
children   with   NDDs   not   only   with   typically   developing   children,   but   also   with   children  
with   other   NDDs,   conducting   cross-­syndrome   comparisons3,   67-­71.   This   is   especially  
important  because   initial  perturbations  may  be  very  similar  across  syndromes,  yet   tiny  
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Table  1.  A  list  of  neurodevelopmental  disorders,  ordered  by  prevalence.  Prevalence  has  
been  divided  by  two  if  reported  for  one  sex  only.  Adapted  from  Bishop72    
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FIGURE  LEGENDS  
Figure  1.  An  infant  with  Down  syndrome  wearing  a  cap  that  records  electrical  activity  in  
the  brain.  Electroencephalography  (EEG)  is  one  of  the  most  commonly  used  methods  to  
measure  brain  responses  in  infants.  
  
Figure  2.  This  figure  compares  the  spatial  and  temporal  resolution  of  different  methods  
used   to   measure   brain   activity   in   infants.   It   also   illustrates   the   relative   degree   of  
tolerance   needed   from   the   infant   for   each   method,   ranging   from   yellow   (low)   to   red  
(high).   EEG   =   electroencephalography;;   ERP   =   event-­related   potential;;   MEG   =  
magnetoencephalography;;   NIRS   =   near   infrared   spectroscopy;;   fMRI   =   functional  
magnetic  resonance  imaging;;  DTI  =  diffusion  tensor  imaging;;  PET  =  positron  emission  
tomography.  From  Lloyd-­Fox,  Blasi,  &  Elwell73  .  
  
Figure   3.   Functional   magnetic   resonance   imaging   (fMRI)   data   showing   the   neural  
response   to   faces   in   10-­12-­year-­olds   and   adults.  Children   show  more   distributed   and  
bilateral   activation   than   adults.   The   colored   bar   to   the   left   represents   the   percent  
increase   in   intensity  of  activation   in   the  experimental   task,  as  compared   to   the  control  
task.   Note   that   according   to   the   radiological   convention   the   left   side   of   the   brain  
represents  the  right  hemisphere  (RH),  and  the  right  side  of  the  brain  represents  the  left  
hemisphere  (LH).  Adapted  from  Passarotti,  et  al.74.  
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Example  of  complex  interactions  
  
Williams  syndrome  (WS)  is  caused  by  the  deletion  of  some  28  
genes  on  one  copy  of  chromosome  7  (7q11.23),  22  of  which  are  
expressed  in  the  brain75.  This  initial  deletion  at  the  genetic  level  is  
linked  to  a  number  of  atypicalities  at  the  level  of  the  brain  (brain  
chemistry,  brain  anatomy,  brain  volume,  hemispheric  asymmetry,  
temporal  patterns  of  brain  activity,  etc.25),  and  these  are  associated  
with  various  cognitive  and  behavioural  abnormalities48.  However,  
although  the  genetic  deletion  is  the  root  cause  of  WS,  this  simple  fact  belies  the  
complexity  of  how  WS  emerges  over  developmental  time.  
  
For  instance,  alterations  in  many  brain  areas  have  been  reported  in  WS.    Changes  in  
one  of  them—the  hippocampus—have  been  linked  to  deficits  in  spatial  navigation  and  
long-­term  memory76.  While  hippocampal  changes  may  be  in  part  due  to  the  genetic  
mutations,  it  is  important  to  highlight  the  fact  that  environmental  factors  such  as  chronic  
stress  and  anxiety  also  affect  neural  development75,  77-­79.  It  is  known  that  stress  and  
anxiety  are  especially  high  in  WS80.  Therefore,  it  is  not  necessarily  the  case  that  it  is  
the  genetic  mutations  that  directly  affect  brain  development  in  WS;;  it  could  also  be  a  
combination  of  emotional  perturbations  that  also  impact  the  brain.  Thus,  it  is  impossible  
to  understand  how  the  WS  neuro-­cognitive  profile  emerges  without  studying  it  very  
early  in  development,  across  time,  and  at  multiple  interacting  levels.  
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How  different  theories  affect  assessment  and  intervention    
Neuropsychological  approach  
•   Assessments  focus  on  the  identification  of  impaired  and  intact  parts  of  
cognition  and  brain.  
•   Once  the  “broken”  module  has  been  identified,  the  intervention  targets  this  
module  specifically  (e.g.,  practicing  language  in  the  case  of  specific  
language  impairment  or  number  in  the  case  of  Williams  syndrome).  
•   If  the  module  is  identified  as  being  underpinned  by  specific  genes,  then  
gene  therapy  may  be  considered  the  only  solution.  
Neuroconstructivist  approach  
•   Assessments  are  broad,  mapping  the  profile  of  the  child’s  strengths  and  
weaknesses  over  time.    
•   No  specific  isolated  impairment  is  assumed.  Rather,  many  domains  will  be  
more  or  less  affected.    
•   The  ideal  intervention  is  based  on  prior  in-­depth  syndrome-­specific  
research  and  usually  takes  place  early  in  the  developmental  trajectory,  
enhancing  protective  factors  and/or  reducing  risk  factors  in  the  child’s  
development.    
•   The  targeted  intervention  need  not  be  in  the  most  visibly  problematic  
domain,  like  language  or  number.  Rather,  it  can  be  targeted  at  basic-­level  
processes  that  underlie  the  domain,  such  as  memory,  attention,  etc.    It  is  
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these  processes  that  would  be  likely  to  have  the  most  cascading  impact  
on  other  domains.    
•   Timely  intervention  is  key.  Effective  intervention  ultimately  depends  on  the  
timing  of  various  interactions  among  domains,  which  is  why  it  is  crucial  to  
base  the  intervention  on  syndrome-­specific  research  that  identifies  how  
systems  change  over  developmental  time  in  a  given  neurodevelopmental  
disorder.  
•   Although  the  earliest  intervention  will  not  necessarily  be  the  most  
successful  one,  younger  brains  are  typically  more  plastic  than  older  ones.  
Also,  early  in  development,  even  relatively  small  perturbations  can  have  
cascading  effects  over  developmental  time.    
  
  
  
  
  
